INS Arihant Launch - Strengthening India's Nuclear ‘Triad’

What is the issue?

India’s first nuclear propelled submarine, INS Arihant, was recently announced to be operationally ready.
With Pakistan’s India-aimed nuclear doctrine and China’s ambiguity, India needs to boost its nuclear arsenal.

What is India's nuclear vision?

India earlier had the capabilities to launch nuclear weapons from the air, mounted largely on its Mirage 2000 and Jaguar Aircraft.
The similar land based missile range from Agni 1 missile (range of 700-900 km) to Agni 5 Missiles (range of 5500 km).
India's aim has been to develop a “credible nuclear deterrent” with capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons from multiple locations on land, air and sea.
The targets are all strategic areas and centres in India's two nuclear-armed neighbours - China and Pakistan.

Why is INS Arihant significant?

The Arihant provides India with a capability to hit either neighbour (China, Pak) from 300 meters under the sea.
The sea-based missiles envisaged for this purpose are

While land-based missile sites can be attacked and destroyed, a submarine-based deterrent is virtually secure against a missile attack.
India is the only country having a sea-based nuclear deterrent, which is not a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council.
India will soon operationalise a second nuclear submarine the “Arighat”.
It is expected to have a fleet of four such submarines by 2022.
According to US Federation of Nuclear Scientists, India currently possesses 130-140 nuclear weapons, Pakistan 140-150 and China 280.
While India tested its first nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan’s first weapons test was in 1990, on Chinese soil.

What are the countries' nuclear principles?

India - India’s nuclear doctrine stated that its nuclear weapons would only be used in retaliation.
It could be against a major attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere, in which nuclear weapons are used.
India also retains the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of major attacks in which chemical or biological weapons are used.
Pakistan - Pakistan, on the other hand, does not have a formal nuclear doctrine.
However as stated before by its officials, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are “aimed solely at India”.
Accordingly, Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large part of its territory, or destroys a large part of its land and air forces.
The possibility of nuclear weapons use if India tries to “economically strangle” Pakistan, or pushes it to political destabilisation also exists.
Pakistan’s statements in recent years have, however, indicated that it would not be averse to using tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict with India.
China - China, like India, had proclaimed that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons.
But China has maintained a measure of ambiguity on whether its “no first use” pledge will be applicable to India.
China's deliberate maintenance of this ambiguity is seen as a signal of its support to Pakistan on any of its nuclear exchange with India.
Chinese ambiguity only adds to India’s determination to strengthen its “Triad” of land, air and sea-based nuclear weapons.

What is China's role in Pakistan?

Without China’s help, Pakistan’s bomb would not exist.
China has also provided Pakistan the designs of its nuclear weapons.
It upgraded Pakistan's “inverters” for producing enriched uranium in Kahuta.
It provided it with Plutonium reactors and separation facilities, for building tactical nuclear weapons.
Pakistan’s ballistic and Cruise Missiles are also replicas of Chinese missiles.

What are the bureaucratic shortcomings in India?

India has a well-organised nuclear command structure headed by the Prime Minister and Cabinet Committee on Security.
However, India needs to address serious issues on the archaic structure of the Ministry of Defence.
E.g. the key military figure in the Nuclear Command structure, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, generally holds office for less than a year
This is hardly the time adequate to become fully familiar with the complexities of India's Strategic Nuclear Command.
There have been repeated proposals for appointment of a full time “Chief or Defence Staff”, or “Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee”.
S/he will hold charge of the Nuclear “Strategic Forces Command” and report to the political authority.
But the proposals have gathered dust for years in the offices of the generalist bureaucracy of the Defence Ministry.
Recommendations for such change even from the Parliament Standing Committee of Defence lie unimplemented.

The present set up of the Defence Ministry thus needs to be drastically reorganised.

Source: BusinessLine