What is the issue?
- India’s first indigenous ballistic-missile armed nuclear submarine (SSBN), INS Arihant, recently completed its first deterrence patrol.
- In this context, it is high time that India makes a reassessment of its policy on nuclear weapons.
Why is SSBN so significant?
- The capability to launch nuclear-armed missiles from nuclear-powered submarines is a greatest form of deterrence a country can possess.
- It requires a very high degree of technological sophistication -
- to be able to manufacture such submarines indigenously
- to equip them with missiles of the desired range
- to fire them safely
- The ability to operate one or more SSBNs requires the highest possible degree of professionalism.
- It covers a wide range of functionaries as
- the prime minister
- the national security advisor
- the commander of the strategic forces
- the commanding officer of the submarine
- every single member of the crew
What is the larger need?
- It is paradoxical that nuclear submarine provides the fullest deterrence only when the captain and his senior officers have the ability to press the symbolic red button on their own.
- However, despite the government’s claims, there are reasons to believe India is not yet there, but is getting closer.
- The completion of the triad thus calls for a profound review of India’s policy on nuclear weapons.
- India is close to achieving credible second strike capability.
- Given this, it must shift focus from negotiating its way through international nuclear weapons control regimes.
- It should certainly move to shaping a world where these weapons of mass destructions are not used.
- India must go from the defensive to the assertive and must champion a global no-first use (GNFU) treaty.
How has the global scenario so far been?
- The 20th century method of trying to prevent more countries from possessing a nuclear weapon has failed.
- The great powers first selectively proliferated nuclear weapons technology to their allies.
- Meanwhile, they tried to keep it away from their adversaries.
- They then foisted an unequal treaty on the rest of the world.
- It aimed at promising to disarm, in return for the rest of the countries committing not to build their own arsenals.
- They then failed on this promise too and decided that they would keep their bombs in perpetuity.
- However, they insisted that the rest forever keep to their no-bomb commitments.
What should the approach be?
- Non-proliferation might not be dead, but it’s a 20th-century idea that has run its course.
- A realistic idea for the 21st century would be the prevention of first-use of nuclear weapons.
- Global no-first use (GNFU) can co-exist with, and can even reinforce, the movement towards disarmament.
- Getting the world’s powers to commit verbally and textually to no-first use will be the first step.
- The strategies to verify, to have assurance, and to deter potential defectors from GNFU and so on will have to be worked out.
- India should take the lead in changing the international narrative to GNFU, move towards working out strategies and mechanisms to make it work.
- GNFU can cause China to make new calculations and there is scope here for India and China to collaborate at international security level.
Source: Business Standard
