

# **Assessing Agri-Pricing Policies**

#### What is the issue?

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- Excess supply, depressed market prices and mounting farmer losses are more a consequence of shortfalls in agri-pricing policies.
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- It calls for providing income support to at least the most vulnerable farmers.  $\ensuremath{\sc vn}$

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#### What is the existing scenario?

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- Good rains, excessive sowing and bumper harvest last year produced excess supply in the market.  $\n$
- It resulted in a decrease in the prices of many crops and thus in farm incomes too.

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• Market prices for major kharif crops fell below the Minimum Support Prices (MSP).

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• The current farm crisis is largely due to the shortcomings in the pricing policies.

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#### What is the policy shortfall?

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- Agri-prices, and therefore farm incomes, are not free-market driven.  $\slash n$
- They are kept artificially low, through use of pricing policy instruments. h

• This is done so that inflation does not erode the rest of the population's purchasing power.

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• The economic tools for protecting farm incomes were not employed to the best advantage.

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- These include -\n
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    - $\ensuremath{\text{i.}}$  the price support scheme
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    - ii. price stabilisation fund
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- iii. market intervention scheme
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- Appropriate adjustments to the export and import rules could have arrested the price fall.

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- It would have diverted the excess supplies to overseas markets.  $\ensuremath{\sc n}$
- But imports were allowed as usual, which worsened the price situation.  $\slash n$

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#### What is the policy on MSP?

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- The Budget promised that Minimum Support Prices (MSPs) would be at least 150% of production costs.  $\n$
- Even if market prices fall below MSP, government will procure the produce on MSP.
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- If it does not procure, it will provide a mechanism to ensure payments reach farmers.

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- That would be equal to the gap between the MSP and the market price.  $\slashn$
- Assuring 50% profit margin over the cost of production is to make farming

remunerative.

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### What are the concerns with MSP?

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- Farmer groups and government differ on the formula for calculating production costs for plugging into the MSP formula.
- But besides this, simply announcing higher MSPs will not raise farmer incomes.
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- As, the system is not geared for scaling up procurement in the first place.  $\scale{n}$
- MSPs are announced for more than 20 crops.  $\slash n$
- But, noteworthy procurement is conducted just for three paddy, wheat and sugarcane.
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- For several crops, last year, the quantities procured were small portions of the total produce.
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- Further, procurement frequently takes places at **prices** below the MSP, according to reports.

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- Also, small and vulnerable farmers usually do not get paid MSPs at all.  $\n$
- This is because they sell their produce to aggregators, not directly in mandis.  $\n$

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# What is the demand-supply mismatch?

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- MSP of Paddy for the 2018-19 kharif season will have to be raised 11-14%, cotton 19-28%, and jowar 42-44%.  $\n$
- These are the projections if the MSP pricing formula of 1.5 times the cost is employed.

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• A rational response of farmers would be to sow more jowar in the next

season.

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- But there is no reason that the demand for jowar would also rise.  $\slash_n$
- A demand-supply mismatch would be inevitable in this case.
- $\noindent n$  It would send the market prices for jowar way below the announced MSP.  $\noindent n$
- It would in turn call for significantly expanded jowar procurement at MSP.  $\space{\space{1.5}n}$
- Thus, clearly, pricing policies distort market prices of crops.  $\ensuremath{\sc n}$
- It sends the wrong signal to farmers on what to produce and how much.  $\space{\space{1.5}n}$
- The policy system fails to correct such situations, which then goes out of control.

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# What should be done?

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• If the problem is volatile incomes, the solution must target incomes, and not prices.

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- Income support payments, paid on a per hectare basis through direct transfers should be considered.
- It would offer an administratively neater, economically far less distortionary and politically more attractive solution.  $\n$
- E.g. Telangana has announced such payments for farmers at the rate of Rs. 10,000/ha (Rs. 4,000/acre) per season.  $\n$
- The cost projections for scaling up this model at national level are roughly same as the estimated bill for price differential payments.  $\n$
- This is excluding the procurement of sugarcane, wheat and paddy, and non-MSP crops.

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• Fiscal space must be found for providing income support this year to the most vulnerable farmers at least.

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• Over the longer term, deep reforms in pricing policy would be the alternative.

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#### Source: The Hindu

