

Assessing Farm Loan Waivers

What is the issue?

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- With mounting pressures from farmers, many state governments are announcing farm loan waivers.
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- It is essential, in this context, to assess the sustainability of this option as well as to look for alternative solutions. $\$

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Why are loan waivers not advisable?

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- Farm loan waivers are a quick-fix solution to farmers' distress. \n
- They may temporarily alleviate the problems of those farmers with access to formal banking.
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- It ignores the real needs of the many poor farmers who rely on moneylenders.

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- They also do not address the fundamental problems of Indian agriculture such as rising costs and falling profitability. $\nline{1}$
- Also, waivers destroy the country's credit culture as certain borrowers tend to default in anticipation of the waiver. \n
- Fresh lending to defaulting borrowers is stalled. $\space{\space{1.5}n}$
- As, banking regulations prohibit disbursement of fresh loans to defaulters unless the loans are restructured. \n
- Significantly, governments fund loan waivers through borrowings. $\slash n$
- This, in turn, results in increased sovereign indebtedness, higher interest

expenses and deteriorating fiscal deficit.

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- Consolidated fiscal deficit is already under stress due to increase in crude oil prices and populist schemes ahead of general elections. \n
- Besides these, farm loan waivers crowd out agriculture-related investments in areas such as irrigation and research. \n

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What are the sustainable mechanisms?

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- Institutional mechanisms like crop insurance and interest subvention are far more effective in tackling farm loan crisis.
- State Bank of India has recommended an income support scheme for small and marginal farmers in the place of loan waivers. \n
- It has estimated the annual cost to be Rs. 50,000 crore or 0.3% of GDP. \n
- Income support makes direct benefit transfer (DBT) to targeted recipients. \n
- It could also increase banking penetration in rural India. $\slash n$
- + E.g. Telengana has launched the 'farmer investment scheme' \slash_{\n}
- Under this, each farmer receives Rs. 8,000 per acre payable in two equal instalments ahead of the kharif and rabi season. \n
- This is to meet their seed, fertiliser, pesticide and field-preparation expenses. $\ensuremath{\sc n}$

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What can the government do for finances?

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• **CPSE** - The government must stop the divestment of central public sector enterprises (CPSEs).

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- It may instead raise substantial funds by rationalising CPSE balance sheets. $\slash n$
- CPSEs may dispose the low yielding assets along with the vast surplus property holdings to reduce their debt. \n
- They can enhance their dividend and tax-paying ability and improve their return on assets and valuation. \n
- So by streamlining CPSEs' balance sheets, the government will be able to address the farm loan crisis without impairing the fiscal deficit. \n

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- **Bonds** The government can issue callable deep discount bonds (CDDBs). $\slash n$
- Deep discount bonds are bonds whose interest accumulates during the tenor of the instrument.

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- These are paid at maturity along with the principal repayment. $\ensuremath{\sc vn}$
- The 'callable' nature of CDDBs allows the government to pay it off earlier than the maturity date. \n
- The government may issue CDDBs of multiple tenors, like 5-year, 10-year, and 15-year, targeted at retail and institutional investors. \n
- The issue of CDDBs will enable the government save on cash interest outgo during the tenor of the instrument. \n
- It can thereby moderate the consolidated fiscal deficit. $\slash n$
- Along with these, large-scale investments in agricultural storage, processing, marketing, transportation, financing and insurance are important. \n

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Source: BusinessLine

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