

## Preventing Misuse of WhatsApp

### What is the issue?

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- There has been a spate of mob violence and lynching across the country due to fear generated by rumours shared on social media platforms.

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- Of all the platforms, WhatsApp is proving the most challenging for investigators due to its strong privacy policy.

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### What makes WhatsApp different?

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- All social media platforms struggle with rumours and misinformation, which are spread through posts as well as direct messages.

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- **Messaging** - While posts can be tracked, messaging services do not leave a trail, making it difficult to track the origin and spread of data.

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- Nonetheless, in most messaging services, information is stored in the parent server and police can request companies to share IP details if needed.

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- But contrarily, WhatsApp communications are “end-to-end encrypted” and information is stored in the devices of users and not on a common server.

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- **Instant** - This means, WhatsApp’s servers handle only “encoded messages in transit”, which can be decoded only in the receiver’s device.

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- Also, even the encrypted messages are deleted once they are delivered at the receiver’s end, thereby leaving no trace within WhatsApp’s apparatus.

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- This implies, even WhatsApp doesn’t know what is being disseminated through its platform and hence can’t provide investigating agencies with

information.

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- **Delayed** - If a message cannot be delivered immediately (e.g. if the receiver is offline), then WhatsApp's servers are said to retain messages for 30 days.

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- But if a message is still undelivered after 30 days, it is nonetheless deleted without a trace.

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### **How have WhatsApp based cases been handled thus far?**

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- Maharashtra Cops claim to have tracked down the source in a few cases where the posts had been shared just a few times.

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- Their "modus operandi" was largely conventional (non technological), and they followed the sender-receiver trail manually by interrogating the entire chain.

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- Such an approach has already proved futile when forwarded messages had gone viral with millions of shares.

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- Hence, if metadata is deleted like in WhatsApp, it is almost impossible to track the trail of forwards beyond a few users.

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- Notably, metadata means - information like "user name, device info, log-in time" and other specifics, which are used for enabling the service function.

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### **How is WhatsApp trying to prevent the misuse of its platform?**

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#### **Research:**

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- WhatsApp has stated that the company is trying to learn more about the

way misinformation spreads on its platform.

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- **Data Analysis** - Its current spree of research is through the amount of metadata that the company gets access to while transmitting messages.

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- The drive is largely focused on understanding when spam is being spread intentionally and when it is happening unintentionally.

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- **Collaboration** - WhatsApp is also seeking to collaborate with various other organisations and governments to arrive at a solution to the current malice.

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- Nonetheless, WhatsApp has asserted its unfettered commitment to user privacy and encrypted instant message delivery without data retention.

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## **Framing Fixes:**

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- At the moment, WhatsApp is working on a mix of in-platform fixes and off-platform intervention.

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- **Internal Fixes** - Within the platform it planning to give more authority to group administrators for restricting publishing in the group.

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- A forward label (which marks forwarded messages) is in beta testing, and an option for flagging doubtful forwarded content is also being considered.

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- Resources like fact-checking websites for verifying content are also being developed in parallel.

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- **External Fixes** - Off-platform, it is expected to initiate measures to educate people about the perils of misinformation and ways to identify them.

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## **What are some actions governments worldwide have taken?**

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- **Liability** - In India, authorities can book group administrators if they are found endorsing false malicious content.

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- But as the admin has no control over what other people in the group will post, he/she is not liable for action if he is a mere spectator.

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- **Awareness** - Group admins are expected to inform any member posting misinformation about the consequences and restrain them from doing so.

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- Government officials too have taken out awareness campaigns to educate the masses on the perils of fake information.

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- In Mexico, private groups collaborated to set up Verificado 2018, a fact-checking initiative, to disrupt the spread of fake news.

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- **Curtailments** - Many nations (including India) have restricted internet during times of unrest, primarily to block ill intentioned WhatsApp campaigns.

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- Uganda has introduced a social media tax as check on online gossip.

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**Source: Indian Express**

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