

# **Reforming Defence acquisition in India**

## What is the issue?

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India has taken many initiatives on its defence acquisition policy landscape, yet it has failed in its implementation.

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## What were the initiatives taken on defence acquisition?

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• The <u>Defence Production Policy 2018</u> had set targets for getting India into the world's top five defence producers and creating 3 million jobs in the defence industry by 2025.

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- It has promised to increase defence exports ten-fold to \$5 billion, while becoming self-sufficient in building fighter aircraft, helicopters, warships, armoured vehicles, missiles and other systems.
- A draft offsets policy was issued later which proposed that vendors will be allowed to discharge offsets by creating defence manufacturing infrastructure. (such as testing laboratories, ranges and skill centres)  $\n$
- This will be made through sponsoring projects that generate hightechnology, and through transferring critical technologies that do not exist in India.

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- It has also proposed special incentives for investments in two defence industry corridors in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh.  $\n$
- Also, Raksha Mantri's Advisory Committee on Ministry of Defence Capital Projects (<u>RMCOMP</u>) was set up to review critical weapon procurements and to identify why they were facing delays. \n
- All these initiatives, though had grand objectives to promote defence acquisition, have failed to make a mark in its implementation.  $\n$

• This has created the need to form a defence procurement organisation in India.

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## What are the progress made in forming DPO?

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- The <u>Dhirendra Singh Committee</u> in 2015 articulated the need for setting up a <u>Defence Procurement Organization</u> (DPO) outside Ministry of Defence. n
- Another committee constituted under Vivek Rae in 2016 told that it would be better to refashion and strengthen the existing defence acquisition structure.  $\n$
- The committee under Pritam Singh in 2017 recommended the creation of a central, autonomous and an empowered professional organization.  $\n$
- This organisation will help building up indigenous defence capability as a strategic imperative for long-term self-reliance.  $\n$
- However, the implementation of these committee's recommendations is getting delayed.
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## What should a DPO contain?

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• **Focus** - The new DPO must holistically <u>focus on defence acquisition</u>, <u>not just</u> <u>procurement</u>.

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- Procurement involves the straight purchase of existing defence equipment from global or domestic "original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)".  $\n$ 

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 Acquisition includes meeting the military's need through channels such as indigenous development.

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• The DRDO is currently pursuing 52 mission-mode projects (MMPs) involving an outlay of over Rs 370 billion.

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- But since the military is not a stakeholder in these MMPs, it does not seriously consider MMPs as acquisition options.  $\n$
- To overcome this, the military must take financial stakes in MMPs and participate in their oversight.
- The reformed DPO must be empowered to meet a service requirement through direct purchase, manufacture under technology transfer, or through an MMP nearing fruition.

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- Specialisation The requirements for each acquisition must be met through purpose-built <u>Integrated Programme Teams</u> (IPTs).
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- Each IPT should include the specialists needed for that specific task.  $\n$
- The specialist requirement will vary not just from project to project, but also at different times within the same project.  $$\n$
- The IPT, therefore, must be constituted and re-constituted continually, in order to optimise the use of manpower to contribute to IPTs when required.  $\n$
- Such flexible IPT structures should eliminate the rationale for a rigid and centralised DPO.

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• **Role allocation** - A refurbished DPO must focus exclusively on equipment acquisition.

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- At present, the defence secretary spends 60% of his time on procurement rather than focussing on long-term strategy and defence diplomacy.  $\n$
- To overcome this, the defence acquisition wing should be upgraded, which is currently under the Department of Defence, into a full-fledged department under a secretary-level official.  $\n$
- Also, the dilemma regarding chairing the DPO either with a cadre of specialist acquisitions managers or with the serving bureaucrats needs to be resolved.

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#### **Source: Business Standard**

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