

SEBI Acts on Kotak Committee Recommendations

What is the issue?

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- Uday Kotak committee to suggest reforms in corporate governance was constituted by the SEBI in June 2017.
- While it has submitted a report with 80 recommendations, SEBI has accepted
 it only partially and plans to implement it in a piecemeal way.

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What are SEBI's recent actions?

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- Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has recently decided to implement some of the Kotak panel report's recommendations.
- While implementation will be done on a piecemeal (spread over time) basis, accusations that SEBI has cherry picked recommendations has sprouted up.
- Notably, only half of the 80 recommendations have been accepted fully, while others have been modified and 18 proposals have been completely discarded.

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• Some have vouched that SEBI is going ahead without sufficient deliberation and that the efficacy of the new laws will need to be tested in practice.

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What are some of the accepted recommendations?

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• Some of the recommendations accepted by SEBI, if passed into law, can make a material difference to public shareholders in critical areas of

governance.

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- Power Separation The proposal intends to make a mandatory separation between the "Chairperson of the Board and CEO" in listed companies.
- This is a significant move and is expected to reduce concentration of powers and root out conflicted decisions such as over-the-top managerial pay.
- But then, whether the Chairperson truly reins in top managers would depend on who appoints him/her and whether he/she is free of promoter influence.
- **Transparency** Disclosure requirements on auditor resignations, related party deals and consolidated quarterly results is also being proposed.
- These will certainly improve the flow of material information to share holders and help them in knowing the company's deals better.
- **Shareholder Approval** The proposal requires companies to seek shareholder approval in all material deals involving payments of over 2% sales.

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- While this is to curb "cosy related party deals", it will be difficult for shareholders win a vote against promoters, due to the skewed ownership patterns in many firms.
- \bullet Also, shareholders are highly constrained in their ability to mobilise institutional support in critical meeting to get vet out transactions. \n

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What are some of the rejected recommendations?

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- \bullet It isn't clear on why the Chairperson-CEO separation or deadlines for holding general body meetings must apply only to the top listed companies. \n
- While the intent may be to reduce the compliance burden on smaller firms, it is untenable in the Indian context as retail portfolios are dominated by midand small-cap firms.
- \bullet Additionally, it is also the smaller sized firms that feature low levels of analyst scrutiny and thus are at greater risk of mis-governance. \n

- SEBI has also omitted the recommendation for expanding its own regulatory ambit to scrutinise qualified accounts and prosecute auditors.
- \bullet Given the seriousness of the issue, it would have been useful if SEBI has elaborated on its reasons for cherry-picking proposals. $\mbox{\sc h}$

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Source: Business Line

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