

Waking Up to New Variants of Terrors - 26/11 Attack

What is the issue?

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• It is ten years since the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack carried out by Pakistan in 2008.

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• It is imperative that a relook at the Indian security establishment is taken, given the emergence of new variants of terror.

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What are the recent instances of terror?

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- India and Mumbai city are no strangers to terror.
- In 1993, over 250 people were killed in Mumbai in a series of coordinated bomb explosions.

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- It was attributed to Dawood Ibrahim, reportedly as retaliation for the demolition of the Babri Masjid.
- In July 2006, bomb explosions in a number of suburban trains in Mumbai killed over 200 people and injured several more.
- The most audacious terror attack till the 26/11 Mumbai terror incident was the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001.
- It was carried out by the Pakistan-based terror outfits, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).

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What is the 21st Century scenario?

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- Most of the 21st century terror attacks reflect a paradigmatic change in the tactics of asymmetric warfare, and the practice of violence.
- Terror attacks are being carried out across the world by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the Islamic State, al-Shabaab, and similar terror outfits.
- They are certainly very different from those witnessed in the previous century.

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• The 26/11 Mumbai terror attack is one of this kind and was an unprecedented exercise in violence. $\$

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What is the case with 26/11?

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• It involved not merely a well-trained terrorist group, but also backed by the resources of a state, viz. Pakistan.

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• It was a case of 'war by other means', in which the authorities in Pakistan, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, the Pakistani armed forces, were involved.

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- Seldom has any terrorist group used such highly sophisticated, state-of-theart communications, including Voice over Internet Protocol.
- Planning for the attack involved the use of a third country address.
- \bullet Handlers in Pakistan were given unfettered freedom to provide instructions to the terrorists during the entire four-day siege. \n
- The choice of the sea route aimed at deception and avoiding detection was again dictated by official agencies.
- \bullet The training regimen dictated by the Pakistani Special Forces involved $\ensuremath{^{\backslash n}}$

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i. psychological indoctrination by highlighting atrocities on Muslims in India and other parts of the globe

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 $\ensuremath{\text{ii.}}$ basic and advanced combat training

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iii. commando training, training in weapons and explosives, swimming and sailing

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• A more unusual feature of the Mumbai attacks was the involvement of two U.S./Canadian nationals of Pakistani origin.

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• They are David Headley (who at the time was a LeT operative) and Tahawwur Hussain Rana.

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• The Mumbai terror attack went on for nearly four days, from the evening of November 26 to the morning of November 29.

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• Seldom has a terrorist incident lasted this length of time, since the Munich Olympics massacre in 1972.

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• From an Indian standpoint, it was perhaps for the first time that an operation of this nature involved

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 $i.\ Rapid\ Action\ Force\ personnel$

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ii. Marine Commandos (MARCOS)

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iii. the National Security Guard (NSG)

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iv. the Mumbai Police

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• As is now known, the Mumbai terror attack was not based on a sudden impulse.

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• Several years of planning and preparation had preceded the attack, even as the Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, was talking peace with then Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh.

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What were the shortfalls?

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- \bullet The Indian security establishment had failed to anticipate an attack of this nature and was not adequately prepared to deal with the situation. \n
- \bullet Secrecy was the very essence of this operation as plans were limited to a mere handful of persons. $\mbox{\sc h}$
- In the LeT hierarchy, apart from Hafiz Sayeed, only a few like Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi (chief military commander), Sajid Mir and Zarar Shah (communications chief) were privy to the operational plans.
- U.S. intelligence is said to have penetrated Zarar Shah's computer and possibly had far more details of the operation than were actually shared with Indian intelligence.

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What are the subsequent measures?

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- In the wake of the terror attack, several steps were initiated to streamline the security set-up.
- \bullet $\underline{\text{Coastal security}}$ was given high priority, and it is with the Navy/Coast Guard/marine police.
- A specialised agency to deal with terrorist offences, the <u>National Investigation Agency</u>, was set up and has been functioning from 2009.
- The <u>National Intelligence Grid</u> (NATGRID) has been constituted to create an appropriate database of security related information.
- Four <u>new operational hubs for the NSG</u> (National Security Guard) have been created to ensure rapid response to terror attacks.
- The <u>Multi Agency Centre</u>, which functions under the Intelligence Bureau, was further strengthened and its activities expanded.

• The <u>Navy</u> constituted a <u>Joint Operations Centre</u> to keep vigil over India's extended coastline.

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What lies ahead?

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- Newer methodologies, newer daringly-executed concepts, and deeply laid plans of terrorist groups are a ground reality.
- So terrorism continues to be a major threat with modern refinements and terrorism mutating into a global franchise.
- One new variant is the concept of 'enabled terror' or 'remote controlled terror', viz. violence conceived and guided by a controller thousands of miles away.

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• Internet-enabled terrorism and resort to remote plotting is thus the new threat.

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• There are no ready-made answers to this; vigilance is important, but being ahead of these new age terror is even more vital.

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Source: The Hindu

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