India’s nuclear strategy builds on the principle of limitation, despite being a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Its policies have been greatly consistent with the key provisions of NPT that apply to nuclear-weapon states.
India has declared nuclear doctrine of 2003, which stands by principles such as credible minimum deterrence, No-First-Use (NFU), non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, remains a fundamental document till date.
The Indian government has not shown any indication that it is attempting to deviate from these declared norms.
India’s record when it comes to observable and measurable benchmarks of responsible nuclear behaviour is a largely positive one.
What is the status of Pakistan nuclear weapon?
Pakistan continues to expand the size of its nuclear arsenal, including with the Nasr platform.
This expansion will take place notwithstanding India’s policy or posture.
Pakistan’s aggressive military strategy combined with an expanding nuclear weapons arsenal should be a matter of deep concern for the whole world, not merely for India.
Pakistan has refused to adopt the NFU policy, and takes undue advantage of its nuclear shield to support and sponsor terrorist attacks in India without any fear of retaliation.
There is a deep-rooted Sino-Pak nuclear axis in building nuclear delivery capabilities, often violating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Pakistan’s medium range ballistic missiles Shaheen I and II also closely correspond to China’s ‘M’ series of ballistic missiles.
Is there any shift in India’s doctrine?
There are series of debate in Western circles about India’s growing favouritism for an offensive nuclear posture.
This supposed shift in India’s position is often interpreted as a response to Pakistan’s acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons or even to India’s inability to deter Pakistan from employing cross-border terrorism.
The proactive approach of India makes a strong case for continuing the minimum deterrence posture.
As of now there is no official indication that India intends to keep its nuclear forces at a ‘higher readiness level’.
What are the issues with India’s nuclear doctrine?
Analysts claiming such a shift in India’s nuclear posture warn about the consequent heightening of nuclear risks.
Researches feel that more holistic view of the concept of minimum deterrence is required that categorically specifies India’s approach.
India’s commitment to the principles of restraint and responsibility in its defence practices remains inadequate.
India’s shift towards a proactive and offensive nuclear posture on rather obscure premises and mistaken assumptions.
Development of offensive conventional concepts for India’s conventional preparedness, is rather inappropriate and misleading.
Why India cannot be soft cornered?
Each country has the right to retaliate when a war is waged against it, including a proxy war.
If India takes an indulgent stand, it may fail to send the fitting signal to Pakistani aggressive posturing and terror acts.
It can undermine the logic of credible minimum deterrence.
India can take initiatives ‘unilaterally’ to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons, like it did by signing the Hague Code of Conduct, may be inconceivable.
India-Pakistan agreement for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons could be a non-starter considering Pakistan’s policies of first use.
Way forward
The significance of India’s doctrine is as similar as the US posture, which indicates that the sole purpose of American nuclear weapons is merely to deter, not to initiate, a nuclear war.
India’s security needs differ in a great deal from Pakistan’s, as India has to deal with a greater security challenge from China.
Pakistan has a reactionary history of nuclear and missile development and it continues to challenge India’s security through proxy wars and state-sponsored terrorism.
The nuclear escalation risk cannot be contained by the revision of India’s minimum deterrence policy, but with a change in Pakistan’s behaviour.
Regional stability is possible only if Pakistan starts to practice restraint, act responsibly, and include the principle of NFU in its nuclear doctrine.
