India’s first indigenous ballistic-missile armed nuclear submarine (SSBN), Arihant, had successfully completed its first deterrence patrol. Click here to know more.
But the pursuit of nuclear-armed submarines reflects a security assessment that is becoming increasingly irrelevant.
How did SSBNs evolve?
SSBNs (Ship, Submersible, Ballistic missile, Nuclear) were first deployed during the Cold War.
It was justified then as a tool of last resort to counter any attack destroying land-based missiles and paralysing air force.
The submarine, undetected at sea, could deliver a counter-strike, assuring the “mutual destruction” of both countries.
Why are SSBNs not very relevant now?
The strategic function of SSBN mentioned above makes little sense in the modern Indian context.
There is no realistic threat that could wipe out India’s existing nuclear deterrent, which the Arihant could counter.
The range of the missiles carried by the Arihant is about 750 km, and so it can only target Pakistan and perhaps China.
Pakistan - Pakistan government has threatened to use “tactical nuclear weapons”.
This is to counter India’s cold-start doctrine that envisions a limited invasion of Pakistan.
However, these are relatively small nuclear weapons that could devastate a battlefield.
It would not certainly affect Indian military’s ability to launch a counter-strike using its existing land or air-based forces.
China - China has consistently pledged that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.
However, even if China were to suddenly change its policy, any attempt would have unacceptable risks regardless of whether India possesses SSBNs.
Global - Even the U.S., which maintains such a large nuclear stockpile, is unwilling to militarily engage a limited nuclear power such as North Korea.
This is because it understands that it cannot reliably disable North Korea's land-based deterrent.
Much of the rest of the world has moved to outlaw nuclear weapons.
Last year, 122 nations voted in favour of the “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”.
The Indian government skipped these negotiations but claimed that it was committed to universal nuclear disarmament.
So the government's active pursuit of nuclear-armed submarines undermines India’s stated international position.
What are the concerns?
Risks - In fact, nuclear-armed submarines increase the risks of an accidental conflict.
Traditionally, nuclear weapons in India have been kept under civilian control, and separate from their delivery systems.
However, the crew of a nuclear-armed submarine will have both the custody of nuclear weapons and the ability to launch them at short notice.
Reportedly, nuclear weapons on Indian SSBNs will be safeguarded by electronic switches, called “permissive action links”.
However, such a setup can dangerously weaken the civilian command-and-control structure.
E.g. Cuban missile crisis
During the crisis, U.S. warships recklessly attacked a Soviet submarine with practice depth charges to force it to surface.
The captain of the submarine, sailing under difficult conditions, was out of radio contact with the Soviet leadership.
He thought that war had broken out and decided to respond with nuclear torpedoes.
But with intervention of another senior officer on the submarine, Vasili Arkhipov, the outbreak of large-scale nuclear hostilities were prevented.
For averting a civilisation-threatening event, Arkhipov was posthumously awarded the “Future of Life” award last year.
Costs - Reportedly, the Indian Navy would eventually like about four SSBNs.
The government has not released precise figures, but the international experience reflects the costs of such a fleet.
E.g. British government recently estimated that the cost of four new SSBNs would be about Rs. 70,000 crore per submarine.
The lifetime costs of operating such submarines are even larger than the initial costs.
British and American estimates suggest that each SSBN requires between Rs. 2,000 crore and Rs. 5,000 crore in annual operational costs.
