Recently in Chhattisgarh in a massive security operation 23 jawans got killed in Maoist ambush.
What was the security operation?
It was a massive operation which included the Special Task Force (STF), District Reserve Guard (DRG) and District Force of the Chhattisgarh Police, the CRPF and its elite COBRA unit.
About 1,000 personnel were deployed from Bijapur alone where in 10 teams were launched— two from Sukma district and eight from three camps in Bijapur.
Six of the eight Bijapur teams were launched from the Tarrem camp while the other two were from Usur and Pamed camp.
Of the six teams, three — one comprising of DRG and STF, another of DRG team and one COBRA team — were launched.
The operational plan was to travel to Alipuda and Jonaguda, 11 and 12 kilometres south of Tarrem respectively.
How was the intelligence gathered?
The Chhattisgarh Police said that the operation was launched based on intelligence inputs of the commander of lethal Battalion 1 of the Maoists.
The operational plan was based on information from the state SIB on the presence of 60 to 70 Maoists in Silger, IB inputs of 40-50 Maoists at Bodaguda and other local intelligence inputs.
One of the primary sources of information is the intercepts of information from a receiver police who was placed on a hill in Dantewada.
In Minpa region, the Maoists know forces are listening to their code.
How did the plan fail?
The two villages that the security personnel passed, Jhiragaon and Teklagudem, were completely empty.
When the forces didn’t find anything at the original target, they returned back.
During the course of return, the Naxals covered the forces from all sides and attacked them who had sophisticated weapons and used in abundance.
The kind of fire which came and the positions the naxals took was well-planned.
The gunbattle began in Tekulugudam, around 12 km from the Tarrem camp.
Once driven down the Tekulugudam hill, some of the security personnel seeked shelter in the houses but were attacked by bullets, UBGLs, along with hand grenades.
Following this, the personnel were chased down the hill into the open plains.
Why it failed?
The entire concept of large 1,000-personnel-plus operations needs to be relooked as this needs concerted thought which the security personnel haven’t done.
When there are large troop movements in a large operation, senior officers fly in and fly out, travel between camps happen often and it is too unwieldy to be kept quiet.
So the Maoists had much time to strip the security forces and their weapons.
In successful operations like the Greyhounds, there were small teams that hit based on solid human intelligence.
This has to be done in the upcoming operations else the game of death and loss will keep happening.
Hence there should be deep consideration of Maoist tactics and security forces and not knee-jerk response and ill-planned operations.
