Reimaging Our National Security

What is the issue?

Our security discourse is focused primarily on special squads, better weaponry, satellite imagery, radars and transponders.
While these are indeed relevant, our counter-terrorist architecture needs to be flexible enough adapt to changing terror tactics.
A rational analysis of whether our preventive machinery is able to match the changing terrorist methodology is required.

How has Terror Tactics Changed?

Lone Wolf - a helplessness is growing in countering the vehicle-mowing-down tactics of Islamic State (IS).
Starting in Nice (France), similar tactics were employed for attacks in Berlin, London, Stockholm, Barcelona and New York.
It is dreaded as it is more innovative as “low cost terror tactics” as compared to earlier ones ‘Al Qaeda’s on 9/11”.
Notably, Over 100 people from Kerala are suspected to have joined the IS and many have moved to Syria.
Cyber Propaganda – Counter Terror (CT) agencies are struggling to prevent the growing online terror propaganda.
Notably, none of the Western agencies or private watch groups could detect from where the IS sends their “online” messages.

What are the challenges globally?

Prevention – Even stopping people already on the “Counter Terror (CT)” radar from committing carnage hasn’t been possible.
A majority of the lone-wolfs (solo uncoordinated attackers) were n the radars of law enforcement for some or the other reason.
This signifies that merely intercepting data in bulks is no guarantee to prevent attacks.
This is because analysing the collected data is not catching up with the wide scope of collection.
Prosecution - Yet another problem is the inability of national investigating agencies to successfully secure evidence.
Notably, thousands of IS fighters who had returned voluntarily or were forcibly repatriated from abroad haven’t been prosecuted yet.

How is the scene in Indian?

Linear Thinking - Mumbai’s law enforcement was focused on commando style attacks in the aftermath of 26/11 attacks in 2008.
But IED attacks (timed devices) restarted - which was seen in Pune Bakery blast of 2010 and later in the Mumbai serial blasts of 2011.
Lacking Coordination - Notably, our air defence capabilities were exposed in the air balloon episode at Ahmadabad airport.
While it was merely an advertisement, it wasn’t coordinated with Air Traffic Control – and was mistaken for a spy drones.
Significantly, none of our security institutions took charge of the situation, which could’ve been a potential attack.
Missing Focus – We don’t have any reliable record of our overseas workers who are the source for terror recruitment.
Notably, the former Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), which was trying to collect such data during the UPA government.
But MOIA has been merged with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) after the present NDA government took over.
This has relegated the high-level attention that our overseas workers had to a minor wing of our vast MEA.

Source: Indian Express