India-Sri Lanka Ties - New Government in Sri Lanka
iasparliament
November 21, 2019
Why in news?
Sri Lanka’s former wartime defence minister Gotabaya Rajapaksa won the recent Presidential elections there.
How does the bilateral future look?
India should not be carried away by the media narrative of Rajapaksas (Gotabaya and his brother Mahinda, President during 2005-15) being inherently “pro-China”.
The Rajapaksas had blamed India for their defeat in the 2015 elections.
However, they have sought to mend ties with Delhi in recent years.
Reportedly, Gotabaya Rajapaksas has said post-elections that China was a “trade partner” while India was a “close relative”.
The stage is thus ready for a reset in the bilateral relations between the two strong governments in Delhi and Colombo.
Nevertheless, this necessitates addressing the structural factors that have complicated the relationship between Delhi and Colombo in the past.
What are the challenges to be addressed?
China - A primary challenge is the China question.
India is aware that China’s economic and strategic dominance in the Indian Subcontinent will continue to grow.
China’s influence is not tied to the regime leadership in its neighbourhood.
It is thus irrelevant to label governments in Colombo as “pro-China” or “pro-India”.
An example would be the approach of the coalition led by President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe in Sri Lanka.
It came to power criticising the Chinese projects in Sri Lanka as financially unsustainable.
Two years into power, the coalition extended full backing to the Chinese projects.
It was this so-called “pro-India” regime that offered China a 99-year lease on the Hambantota project and stalled key projects of interest to Delhi.
In any case, Delhi cannot expect its neighbours to shut down economic and commercial engagement with Beijing.
Tamils - Another structural factor shaping India’s relations with Sri Lanka is the Tamil question.
India’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s tragic civil war has been far more consequential than the China factor in complicating the bilateral relations.
Successive coalition governments in Delhi from 1989 to 2014 struggled to balance the competing interests in Chennai and Colombo.
The strong mandate in 2014 had given Modi greater space to manage the competing imperatives on the Lanka policy.
However, the Tamil question has not gone away.
If the Gotabaya government can advance reconciliation with the Tamil minority, it will be easier for India to strengthen ties.
But the Tamil issue is no longer a bilateral one between Delhi and Colombo.
The Western powers have expressed deep concerns about the war crimes in the military campaign against the LTTE.
What should the approach be?
Delhi will be right to ask Colombo not to take steps with Beijing that threaten India’s security.
Delhi and Colombo need a clear understanding of mutual red lines relating to national security.
On the other hand, the world rediscovers the geopolitical value of Sri Lanka at the heart of the Indo-Pacific.
Given this, Colombo has huge opportunities to leverage its location for national benefit.
Delhi needs to invest some political capital in resolving problems such as the long-standing dispute over fisheries.
Beyond its objection to China’s BRI projects, Delhi should offer sustainable terms for infrastructure development.
It also needs to contribute more to the development of Colombo’s defence and counter-terror capabilities.
In all, with a strong government in place in Sri Lanka, it is time for Delhi to rethink on its relationship with Colombo.
