The Malabar naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal is seen as a maritime response to China’s aggression in Dokalam.
Why India’s plan might not succeed?
Modern-day trading nations regard the oceans as a shared global common, with equal opportunity rights for all user states.
Unless a sea-space is a site of overlapping claims (Ex. South China Sea) or a contested enclave in a geopolitically troubled spot (Ex. Persian Gulf), no coastal state can deny another the use of the high seas.
This balance only changes during war.
During peace-time operations, the maritime forces enjoy assured access to the seas that lie beyond national territorial waters.
Given the Beijing’s key role in the geopolitics and economics of the Indian Ocean region, a plan to deny its warships entry into India’s surrounding seas is unlikely to succeed.
What India can do?
India could now resort to a strategy of counter-power projection by expanding the scope of its naval deployments in the South China Sea.
Indian Navy could plan to use the South China Sea’s geopolitically sensitive spaces for the strategic power projection.
Such a strategy is bound to have a deterrent effect on China’s naval posture in the Indian Ocean region.
After an arbitral tribunal invalidated many of China’s historical rights within the nine-dash line, Beijing has been extremely cautious about perceived challenges to its authority.
This vulnerability must be taken advantage of by India.
The Indian Navy must plan for counter-presence in China’s near-seas, where Beijing cannot prove a territorial infringement, yet feel the pinch of a perceived violation of its political sphere of influence.
