Need for Conflict De-escalation Mechanisms - India & Pakistan
iasparliament
April 27, 2019
What is the issue?
India and Pakistan was at a near stand-off following the recent Pulwama terror strike.
This calls for assessing the effectiveness of communication channels between them as a conflict management mechanism.
Why is communication crucial at war times?
Talking to one’s adversary in the midst of a war, a limited war or even hostility is often viewed as undesirable in the public mind.
But the long history of warfare and India’s own experience in dealing with past crises has proved otherwise.
Talking to one’s adversaries is a crucial requirement for de-escalation and for bringing the two sides back from the brink.
Such talks are often done cautiously and diplomatically via the ‘back channel’, away from media attention.
It focusses on de-escalation, meeting the aims behind the war-talk and achieving an honourable exit from the tussle.
E.g. during the Kargil conflict, politically appointed interlocutors had conducted discreet discussions on de-escalatory measures
Even the two Cold War rivals had to keep talking to each other through the worst years of their rivalry to de-escalate tensions.
What happened after the Pulwama incident?
In the recent Pulwama terror strike on a CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) convoy, nearly 40 security personnel were killed.
Following this, there was a military encounter between India and Pakistan. Click here to know more.
As learnt, there were hardly any pre-existing/dedicated channels of communication between the two countries then.
Why was there a communication breakdown?
For the most part of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) -I and II governments, there was an established mechanism.
Backchannel conversations took place by special envoys appointed by the respective Prime Ministers.
But the current Bharatiya Janata Party-led government decided to discontinue that time-tested and useful practice.
So there were apparently no back-channel contacts between India and Pakistan during the above-mentioned crisis.
Also, the ones that were in place were not put to use too.
The conversation at the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) level is the highest military contact that currently exists between India and Pakistan.
It has often played a de-escalatory role, but it was not activated during the crisis.
Pakistan did not have a National Security Adviser (NSA) or an equivalent official.
So unlike previous years, there were no NSA-level talks either.
The two High Commissioners were too called back to their home countries for consultations.
It is during crisis periods that envoys should stay put in their respective High Commissions.
This would help find ways of defusing tensions and relaying messages and options back to their governments.
Unfortunately, India and Pakistan chose to do the exact opposite.
In all, very little bilateral conversation actually took place to de-escalate the crisis.
What are the risks involved?
In the absence of bilateral conflict de-escalation mechanisms, the nuclear-armed countries could head towards serious conflict.
Perhaps, the government wanted to keep decision-making during the crisis in its sphere, to ensure maximum political mileage from it.
India might have chosen to not communicate for the political utility of the ‘teaching Pakistan a lesson’ rhetoric.
But it is to be noted that when the hostile parties do not talk to de-escalate tensions, others tend to step in.
Outsourcing conflict management to third parties, especially in the absence of one’s own mechanisms, is likely to lead to disaster.
What does it call for?
New Delhi and Islamabad must keep lines of communication open at all times, especially during crisis times.
There is a need to reinstate/re-establish high-level backchannel contacts with interlocutors in Pakistan.
The two sides should also urgently put in place dedicated bilateral conflict de-escalation mechanisms.
