Pakistan today has the world’s fastest growing nuclear stockpile, according to a report published in 2015.
A majority of nuclear warheads produced by Pakistan in the last decade are thought to be low-yield tactical nuclear weapons (TNW).
How Pakistan’s dynamics of Tactical Nuclear Weapons changed?
Though the Indian Army had long refrained from formally accepting “Cold Start” as a professed strategy of the armed forces, the recent statement of India’s army chief acknowledged the existence of Cold Start.
The main objective of the Cold Start Doctrine is to launch a retaliatory conventional strike against Pakistan inflicting significant harm on the Pakistan Army before any international community could intercede, but not in way Pakistan would be provoked to make a nuclear attack but to bring it to bargain.
Pakistan as a result has shifted its own doctrine from strategic deterrence to what it calls full spectrum deterrence.
In essence, this means Pakistan’s willingness to adopt a nuclear first use policy in a tactical environment.
In this scenario, the burden of the Pakistani posture would be on first-strike capabilities in a limited theater setting using tactical battlefield weapons.
What are the shortcomings of TNW’s?
TNW have the ability to end a conflict or at least de-escalate the engagement.
However, just because TNWs were an effective deterrent during the Cold War in a European setting does not mean that this can replicated in South Asia.
The use of TNWs against an enemy force on its own soil would also have tremendous repercussions for Pakistan.
It may result in killing large chunks of its own population in the event of sudden crisis.
The entire strategic game plan would fail if India decides to respond by using its own strategic weapons against Pakistan’s main cities.
The expected destruction of enemy forces as a result of the use of TNWs may not be sufficient to either end the conflict or deescalate it.
Pakistan claims to have made significant improvement in its nuclear security environment, but there are no independent reports which can sufficiently verify these claims.
The gradual radicalization of the Pakistani army over the past three decades poses a grave danger to Pakistan’s nuclear security in terms of insider threats. The gravest threat to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is posed by this insider-jihadi collaboration.
What should be done?
Pakistan takes immense pride in its nuclear capability, which is indeed formidable.
But it is time Pakistan conveyed its nuclear maturity by talking more about its nuclear security provisions.
Such debates would create awareness amongst the Pakistani masses about their individual responsibility toward their country’s nuclear arsenal.
It would also deter attempts by non-state actors to involve the local population in any sabotage attempts against nuclear facilities.
Pakistan needs to appreciate that a robust and impregnable security system is essential not only for its own nuclear stability, but also for global peace and security.
