There is now a mutual recognition in both India and China that a posture of hostility has undermined everybody’s interests.
While sprouts of recalibrating the relationship has started to show up, the process needs to be sustained to attain sufficient benefits.
How has Indo-China relations progressed lately?
The India-China relationship has always been too complex and has varied from “Competition to cooperation to discord” at different points in time.
2017 witnessed all facets of this relationship through varied events:
India’s trenchant critique of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
India’s entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,
The Doklam Crisis (The most significant of all)
BRICS - acceleration of multilateral cooperation
Both positive and negative economic engagements
But despite these variations across engagements, the Doklam standoff highlighted a clear case of simmering animosity.
Why did Doklam escalate to such proportions?
While trigger for Doklam was for control over a narrow stretch of barren land, the conflict nucleus was formed much earlier in other arenas.
The main reason for the conflagration is the recent development of a deep rooted negative perception on both sides for the other’s foreign policy moves.
This collapse in geopolitical trust was a striking factor that was widely visible across domains – and China’s expansionist ambitions only aggravated this.
China’s rising economic and political profile along with its massive initiatives like the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) had got India concerned.
Chinese foray into India’s South Asian neighbourhood through infrastructure and strategic projects has been seen by India as an affront on its sovereignty.
On the other hand, India’s pursuit of deeper military engagement with “U.S. and Japan” (Beijing’s main strategic rivals) wasn’t to the liking of China.
These conflicting pursuits nudged both countries to adopt an assertive foreign policy against the other to keep things under check.
Consequently, India tilted closer to the U.S., while China moved towards Pakistan, and on a scale that wasn’t witnessed even during the Cold War.
What was the result of such a hardball approach?
Throughout the hard-line phase, neither side was able to extract any significant concessions from the other.
NSG membership (Nuclear Suppliers Group) proved elusive for India majorly because of Chinese resistance.
Contrarily, China’s wasn’t successful in its bid to get India to tone down its resistant rhetoric against its BRI.
While China shielded Pakistan aided terror networks in international forums, India openly allied with anti-China forces as a counter.
In this backdrop, the heightened escalation at Doklam proved to be a wake up for both sides to realise the futility of such masochistic approach.
Hence, a policy reset seems to have commenced currently, and optimism is brewing on both sides for enhanced cooperation.
How does the future look?
The conciliatory approach to China in the current setting has aroused scepticism from some, as they fear that vital issues might get compromised.
But the government seems to be thinking that with a conciliatory approach with China, India can’t tide over the multiple challenges in the neighbourhood.
Further Indo-China friction will only enhance Pakistan’s leverage over Beijing and reduce India’s bargaining power vis-a-vis Japan and USA.
Notably, despite their adverse relationship with China, both Japan and USA have truly valued their interdependence with Beijing, particularly in trade.
Further, India also sees value in enhancing economic cooperation with China, which could better shape the overall geo-political outcomes in the region.
